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Executive Summary
A growing body of empirical evidence shows that some ﬁnancial aid
programs increase college enrollment. Puzzlingly, there is little com-
pelling evidence that Pell Grants and Stafford Loans, the primary fed-
eral student aid programs, are effective in achieving this goal. In this
chapter, we provide an in-depth review of this evidence, which taken as
a whole suggests that complexity and uncertainty in the federal aid sys-
tem undermine its efﬁcacy. We document complexity in the aid system,
comparing it in particular to complexity in the tax system. We build on
our previous work by showing that complexity in the aid process does
little to improve the targeting of both student loans and grants, for both
dependent and independent students. We conclude that the current tar-
geting of aid can be reproduced with a much simpler aid process. While
we show that the targeting beneﬁts of complexity are small, we further
document that the costs are large. We offer new estimates of the compli-
ance costs faced by applicants and the administrative costs borne by the
government and colleges. These costs total at least 4 billion dollars per
year. The perspective of behavioral economics suggests that the true cost
is even higher, since complexity and uncertainty may discourage the tar-
get population from applying for student aid.
4.1 Introduction
Each year, ten million households seeking federal aid for college com-
plete a detailed questionnaire about their ﬁnances—the Free Applica-
tion for Federal Student Aid (FAFSA). At ﬁve pages and 127 questions,
the FAFSA is slightly longer than IRS Form 1040 and substantially
longer than forms 1040EZ and 1040A. Since the majority of householdsuse the shorter IRS forms, for the typical household the aid application
is longer and more complicated than the federal tax return.
Complexity in the federal tax code has received considerable atten-
tion from economists and has been the focus of reform efforts for
decades. Researchers have made substantial progress in conceptualiz-
ing and calculating the compliance burden created by the tax system,
which encompasses the time and effort required to understand the tax
code, to maintain relevant ﬁnancial records, and to ﬁll out forms.1
In stark contrast, complexity in ﬁnancial aid has received little atten-
tion from researchers. As college attendance has expanded, the ﬁnancial
aid process has affected an increasing proportion of U.S. households.
The burden this process imposes on families is of increasing policy rele-
vance, as even moderate compliance costs, when summed over millions
of households, create substantial costs to the economy. Further, com-
plexity in the aid process may undermine the efﬁcacy of aid in achiev-
ing its purpose, which is to make college an option for those who could
not otherwise afford to attend. If complexity burdens those on the mar-
gin of college entry, it could well blunt the impact of aid on their school-
ing decisions. Contributing to this concern is the fact that the aid process
is not only complex but also highly uncertain, with deﬁnitive informa-
tion about freshmen-year aid not revealed until after college applica-
tions are ﬁled, in the spring of the senior year in high school. Those high
school students most sensitive to cost may not even apply to college if
they do not know it is affordable, so the back-loading of information in
this setting may be particularly costly.
In this paper, we use the perspectives of both classical and behavioral
economics to examine the costs of complexity in student ﬁnancial aid.
We have explored this topic in previous work (Dynarski and Scott-
Clayton 2006, 2007). The current paper extends this work along several
dimensions. First, we provide a comprehensive review of the literature
on the causal impact of student aid on outcomes, discussing why stan-
dard estimates of this relationship are likely to be biased. We highlight
what the evidence suggests about the optimal design of ﬁnancial aid
programs. Second, we broaden our quantitative analysis to include the
important topic of student loans, which now dominate the federal stu-
dent aid budget. Third, the present analysis includes both dependent
and independent students, while Dynarski and Scott-Clayton (2006)
considered only dependent students. Independent students (students
older than 24, or who are married or have children) now comprise 47
percent of undergraduate students. They receive 58 percent of Pell
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are of undeniable policy relevance. Fourth, we provide a more detailed
discussion of the time costs of completing the FAFSA, focusing in par-
ticular on how the FAFSA questions differ from those on the 1040.
We estimate that the ﬁnancial cost of complexity is at least 4 billion
dollars a year. Ten million FAFSAs are ﬁled each year. We estimate that,
on average, the FAFSAtakes about ten hours to complete. Assuming the
current, average hourly wage of 17.50 dollars, we estimate a time cost of
1.75 billion dollars per year. Additionally, colleges spend over 2 billion
dollars annually on salaries for staff who administer federal ﬁnancial
aid or other aid based on the federal aid formula. Colleges are also statu-
torily required to audit at least 30 percent of these aid applications; at
least three million such audits take place annually. By comparison, the
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) audit rate on personal income tax returns
is 1.5 percent, or two million audits per year. The time costs of FAFSA
audits add to the costs of the aid application process.
The nonﬁnancial costs of complexity are less certain. Economic theory
and empirical evidence predict that complexity and uncertainty in aid
could undermine their ability to affect schooling decisions. A long-
standing theoretical and experimental literature suggests that even
seemingly minor differences in program design can have profound im-
pacts on behavior (Kahneman and Tversky 2000). Aburgeoning empir-
ical literature has demonstrated that these predictions hold in real-life
situations (Madrian and Shea 2001). Empirical evidence on the behav-
ioral impact of aid suggests that complexity in the aid system under-
mines its efﬁcacy. While simple, easily communicated aid programs
have been shown to have a robust impact on college entry and comple-
tion, we have little to no compelling evidence that the traditional forms
of student aid (which require a FAFSA) increase schooling for their tar-
get populations. Complexity may be the culprit. Simply put, potential
college students cannot respond to a price subsidy if they do not know
it exists.
While the bounds on the costs of complexity are wide, we show that
its beneﬁts are conclusively miniscule. With student-level data from the
2003–2004 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey (NPSAS 2004),
we ﬁnd that much of the complexity in the aid system does little to im-
prove the targeting of aid. Nearly all of the variation in aid is generated
by a handful of the more than 70 data items used in the aid formula. Ad-
justed gross income (or, for tax nonﬁlers, earnings from work), marital
status, family size, and the number of family members in college explain
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quarters of applicants, this simpliﬁed aid formula produces grants
within 100 dollars of the grants produced by the current formula. For
about 85 percent of students, simulated grants are within 500 dollars of
current grants. A new contribution of the present paper is to provide
analogous estimates for subsidized student loans. Eligibility for these
loans is determined through the same process used for Pell Grants. As
we show, the overwhelming majority of the variation in subsidized loan
eligibility is explained by a handful of data items.
The items that we ﬁnd drive eligibility for loans and grants—adjusted
gross income and family size—are already collected via income tax
forms. Aid eligibility could be determined using existing tax informa-
tion, and the aid application could be eliminated. This approach is sim-
ilar in spirit to a no-return tax system, in which tax authorities use data
they already have collected to determine tax liability (U.S. Government
Accounting Ofﬁce 1996; Gale and Holtzblatt 1997). A key lesson of our
research is that we can substantially reduce complexity and uncertainty
in the aid system if we are willing to tolerate minor imperfections in
measuring ability to pay. Reducing complexity appears to have little po-
tential downside and improves the likelihood that aid will serve its in-
tended goal: opening the doors of college to those who have the ability
but not the means to further their education.
4.2 Student Aid in the United States
Two programs provide the bulk of federal aid to college students: the
Pell Grant and the Stafford Loan. Pell Grants average 2,500 dollars per
recipient, with a maximum value of 4,050 dollars. Pell Grants ﬂow al-
most exclusively to families with incomes below 40,000 dollars (Sted-
man 2003). During the 2004–2005 academic year, 13.6 billion dollars in
Pell Grants was delivered to over ﬁve million students (College Board
2005). During the same year, 55 billion dollars in loans was delivered to
undergraduates through the Stafford Loan program. Half of the
Stafford loans distributed are need-based subsidized loans, for which
the government pays the interest while the student is in college. The
other half is unsubsidized Stafford loans, for which interest accrues dur-
ing college. While the unsubsidized loans are provided regardless of
need, students must go through the need-determination process to ac-
cess them. Dependent undergraduates can borrow 2,625 dollars for the
ﬁrst year of college, 3,500 dollars for the second year, and 5,500 dollars
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check. Parents can borrow unsubsidized loans up to the cost of college
(net of aid) through the federal Parent Loan for Undergraduate Students
(PLUS) program, which does require a credit check and for which inter-
est accrues during college (U.S. Department of Education 2005b).
4.3 Evidence on the Impact of Student Aid
A simple model of human capital unambiguously predicts that subsi-
dizing college costs raises the privately optimal level of schooling. While
the theoretical predictions are clear, it is an empirical question how
much a given dollar of subsidy affects behavior. Answering this empir-
ical question is a challenge, since eligibility for subsidies is certainly not
random. Rather, aid is offered to students on the basis of characteristics
that have their own effect on the probability of college attendance. For
example, Pell Grants ﬂow to low-income youth. If these students are rel-
atively unlikely to attend college, perhaps because of low levels of
parental education or low-quality secondary schooling, then estimates
of the effect of aid based on this source of variation in aid will be down-
wardly biased. Conversely, since many colleges use merit scholarships
to attract high-achieving students, the bias on estimates of the effect of
aid will, in some cases, be positive. Since many studies in this literature
pool all sources of aid into a single variable, it is frequently impossible
to sign the bias on a given estimate.
We can attempt to eliminate this bias by controlling for a vector of re-
gressors. Common covariates include measures of ﬁnancial resources,
such as parental income, and measures of individual ability, such as
standardized test scores. Whatever the particular empirical strategy or
functional form, these studies share the common assumption that con-
trolling for observables can absorb individual differences correlated
with schooling decisions and schooling costs. Under plausible condi-
tions, this approach will fail. First, we may not properly model the
schooling decision, by omitting relevant variables or including them in
the wrong functional form. Second, even if we correctly model the
schooling equation, data on relevant characteristics may simply be un-
available. For example, parental wealth affects schooling decisions, both
directly and through eligibility for aid, but complete information on
parental wealth is rarely available in survey data, especially among
adults who have completed their education.
In sum, the omitted variables problem may be unsolvable using stan-
Complexity and Targeting in Federal Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis 113dard multiple regression methods. One solution is a randomized, con-
trolled trial, in which aid amounts are randomly assigned to a pool of
potential college students. Such an experiment has never been ﬁelded.
Alternatively, the analyst can use observational data to study the out-
come of a natural, or quasi, experiment, in which a discrete shift in aid
policy differentially affects observationally identical individuals. We
next describe the evidence from such studies.
Dynarski (2003) takes advantage of variation in grant eligibility induced
by the elimination of the Social Security student beneﬁt program in the
early 1980s. From 1965 to 1982, the Social Security Administration paid for
millions of students to go to college. Under this program, the 18- to 22-year-
old children of deceased, disabled, or retired Social Security beneﬁciaries
received monthly payments while enrolled full time in college. The aver-
age annual payment in 1980 to the child of a deceased parent was 6,700 dol-
lars. At the program’s peak, 12 percent of full-time college students aged
18 to 21 were receiving Social Security student beneﬁts.3
In 1981, Congress voted to eliminate the program. Enrollment sank
rapidly and by the 1984–1985 academic year, program spending had
dropped by 3 billion dollars. Except for the introduction of the Pell
Grant program in the early 1970s, and the various GI Bills, this is the
largest and sharpest change in grant aid for college that has ever oc-
curred in the United States. Using difference-in-differences methodol-
ogy, and proxying for beneﬁt eligibility with the death of a parent dur-
ing an individual’s childhood, Dynarski (2003) ﬁnds that the elimination
of the Social Security student beneﬁt program reduced college atten-
dance probabilities of the affected group by more than a third. These es-
timates suggest that an offer of 1,000 dollars in grant aid increases the
probability of attending college by about 3.6 percentage points.
A more recent set of policy innovations has provided variation in aid
that has proved valuable to researchers. Since the early 1990s, over a
dozen states have established broad-based merit aid programs. In 1993,
Georgia introduced the Georgia Helping Outstanding Pupils Educa-
tionally (HOPE) Scholarship, funded by a state lottery. The program al-
lows free attendance at Georgia’s public colleges for state residents who
maintain at least a 3.0 average in high school and college. Those attend-
ing private colleges are eligible for an annual grant that roughly equals
average tuition at the public universities. Dynarski (2000) estimates the
impact of Georgia’s program by comparing changes in college atten-
dance rates in Georgia to changes in other southeastern states during the
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tween Georgia and the rest of the southeastern United States in the time
trend of college attendance rates. She ﬁnds that the program substan-
tially increased college entry in Georgia, by 4 to 6 percentage points per
1,000 dollars in aid. Research on similar state programs has also shown
them to be effective in increasing college attendance (Abraham and
Clark 2006; Kane 2003; Dynarski 2004a, forthcoming). The programs
also appear to increase the share of young people completing a college
degree (Dynarski, forthcoming). Effects are strongest among women,
especially Blacks and Hispanics.
This body of research has established that young people are sensitive
to college costs in making their schooling decisions. In fact, from a ra-
tional perspective, they appear to be too sensitive, given how small the
direct costs of college are. At the typical public college, required tuition
and fees average 6,000 dollars; at a community college they are closer to
2,000 dollars (College Board 2006). These costs are quite small when
weighed against the lifetime return to a college degree. On average, col-
lege graduates make 50 percent more than high school graduates (Col-
lege Board 2004). These returns accrue for decades, whereas tuition
costs accumulate for only a few years. The strong response of young
people to the aid programs just described provides indirect evidence
that present costs loom very large for this population.
All of the programs discussed previously are outside of the traditional
federal student aid system. What about the traditional programs? There
is little to no persuasive evidence that the federal aid programs are
similarly effective—or at all effective—in increasing the college enroll-
ment of young people. This lack of evidence does not reﬂect lack of effort:
the Pell Grant program has received considerable attention from re-
searchers. Hansen (1983) examined enrollment rates before and after
implementation of the Pell Grant program. Hansen found that while en-
rollment rates of all income groups increased during the 1970s, enroll-
ment among low-income students did not increase disproportionately.
Kane (1995) utilizes more years of data and limits the sample to women,
whose enrollment patterns were less disrupted by the Vietnam War than
those of men, but is also unable to ﬁnd an effect. Bettinger (2004) uses
regression-discontinuity analysis to examine whether the Pell Grant re-
duces the dropout rate among college students: his results suggest this
is the case, but he stresses that his estimates are too sensitive to speciﬁ-
cation and functional form to draw strong conclusions. Just one study
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the Pell on schooling decisions: Seftor and Turner (2002) ﬁnd a small but
robust effect on the college attendance of older, independent students.
When examined as a whole, this body of evidence is puzzling. How
can some aid programs produce such large, robust impacts while the
others have little detectable effect? The populations are similar: the So-
cial Security student beneﬁt program served families similar to that
served by Pell: low-income, nonwhite, disproportionately headed by
single parents. The merit aid programs appear to have been particularly
effective for Blacks and Hispanics. So the answer is not that the popula-
tion served by Pell is insensitive to price.
A striking difference between the effective, nontraditional programs
and the traditional programs is in the paperwork requirements they im-
pose on applicants. The HOPE application consists of a half page of ba-
sic biographical information. High schools proactively send transcript
data to the state in order to identify scholarship winners. Application re-
quirements were even simpler in the Social Security student beneﬁt pro-
gram. The Social Security Administration proactively sent a letter to
each beneﬁciary shortly before his or her eighteenth birthday, asking
about college plans. If the beneﬁciary was planning on college, beneﬁt
checks continued to arrive. Renewal required only conﬁrmation of en-
rollment from the college registrar. By contrast, the traditional aid pro-
grams impose complicated paperwork and procedural requirements on
applicants. We describe this process in detail in the next sections.
A second difference between the effective aid programs and the tra-
ditional aid programs is in the extent to which students understand the
programs and can accurately estimate their eligibility in the years pre-
ceding college. In the case of the Social Security program, families knew
exactly the beneﬁts they would receive, since a student who qualiﬁed
simply received the child beneﬁts that had previously gone to his or her
family. Similarly, people are quite knowledgeable about the Georgia
HOPE program. More than 70 percent of Georgia high school freshmen
are able to name the program without prompting. Fifty-nine percent,
when asked to list some requirements of HOPE, volunteer that a high
school GPAof 3.0 is necessary (Henry, Harkreader, Hutcheson, and Gor-
don 1998). This level of knowledge about a government program would
be remarkable among adults; it is even more striking among young
teenagers. By contrast, a U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce (GAO)
analysis found that nearly 90 percent of high school sophomores in 1980
did not know about the Pell Grant program (GAO 1990).
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Establishing eligibility for federal aid is called need determination. The
data elements that determine need are collected in the FAFSA, which is
required for all federal grants and loans.4 From information on the
FAFSA, the U.S. Department of Education computes the expected family
contribution (EFC), an estimate of how much the family can pay out of
pocket for college. Needis deﬁned as the difference between the cost of at-
tendance (e.g., tuition, fees, books, living expenses) and this family con-
tribution. The basics of need determination have changed little since they
were laid out over ﬁfty years ago. In 1953, John Monro, dean of admis-
sions at Harvard College, described to his colleagues at a College Board
conference the formula he used to assign ﬁnancial aid to Harvard admits.
The assembled aid administrators were eager to establish a common for-
mula for assigning aid so that they could quash the competitive bidding
for the best students that had recently developed among elite colleges.
Within a year, a common aid application was in use (Duffy and Goldberg
1998; Wilkinson 2005). The schools that initiated this need-determination
process typically enrolled students from families with relatively high in-
comes and asset holdings, and so sought detailed measures of wealth
and income so that they could measure need among families with com-
plicated ﬁnancial situations.5As we next show, today’s FAFSAreﬂects its
history, providing extremely ﬁne measures of ability to pay at levels of
income that far exceed the effective cutoffs for federal aid.
The FAFSA collects detailed information about the student’s and par-
ents’income, assets, and various other beneﬁts and expenditures. In table
4.1 we compare the FAFSA to the IRS 1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ income
tax forms (see http:/ /www.ifap.ed.gov/fafsa/0607FinalFAFSA.html for
a copy of the 2006–2007 FAFSA). The FAFSA, at ﬁve pages and 127 ques-
tions, is longer than Form1040EZ (one page, thirty-seven questions) and
Form 1040A (two pages, eighty-three questions). It is comparable to
Form 1040 (two pages, 118 questions).6For the families targeted by need-
based aid, complexity in the aid application rivals the complexity they
experience in the income tax system. Most families eligible for the Pell ﬁle
the shorter 1040Aor 1040EZ; 86 percent of ﬁling households with income
below 50,000 dollars (and two-thirds of all households) use these simpli-
ﬁed IRS forms. The contrast between Form 1040EZ and the FAFSA is es-
pecially striking. With a third of the FAFSA’s questions and a ﬁfth of its
pages, the IRS captures the information needed to determine tax liability
for the very population targeted by need-based aid.
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ﬁner measures of ﬁnancial resources than the tax forms. Thirty-three
FAFSA questions probe for sources of income not shown on the W-2,
compared to two on the 1040EZ, twelve on the 1040A, and nineteen on
the 1040. Further, while none of the tax forms ask about assets, the
FAFSA has six questions on this topic. And because the aid formula ap-
plies different “tax rates” to the student and parents, the FAFSAinquires
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Table 4.1 
Complexity of the FAFSA versus IRS 1040
1040 1040A 1040EZ FAFSA
2005 2005 2005 2006–2007
Number of pages (excluding instructions) 2 2 1 5
Total number of questions 118 83 37 127
Nonﬁnancial items
Identifying information 6 6 6 22
Demographic/family information 8 8 2 18
Enrollment status/school information 0 0 0 7
Signature and preparer information 12 12 12 8
Other 1 1 1 10
Financial items
Earned income 1 1 1 5
Other income 19 12 2 33
Assets 0 0 0 6
Deductions/credits/allowances 39 22 2 12
Tax amounts from tables, calculated lines 21 12 6 6
Withholdings, refund preferences 11 9 5 0
Number of items required for computation 
of tax/refund or aid amount∗ 71 43 8 72
Length of signing statement 49 words 64 words 59 words 232 words
Ofﬁcial estimate of time to prepare∗∗ 16 hours 13 hours 8 hours 1 hour
Source: Authors’ counts unless otherwise noted. Counts for the FAFSA are for dependent students
with two parents and includes questions on required student and parent worksheets. Total number
of questions includes subquestions and nonnumbered questions and ensures that items such as
name and address are counted in the same way on both IRS and FAFSA forms.
∗For the FAFSA, this excludes items required only to determine dependency status or general eligi-
bility for federal aid.
∗∗Estimates from ofﬁcial Paperwork Reduction Act notices in the instructions accompanying each
form. Internal Revenue Service-reported estimates of time and cost of preparation are based on non-
business ﬁlers who self-prepare without tax preparation software (these estimates can be found in
each form’s instructions, on page 78, 58, and 23, respectively). The FAFSA estimate can be found on
page 7 of the FAFSA.twice about each ﬁnancial resource, once of the parents and once of the
student.7
As we will show later in this chapter, there are few questions on the
FAFSA that low-income families can simply ignore. Most of the ques-
tions apply to individuals of any income, including those about child
support and “other untaxed income not reported elsewhere.” Several,
such as those about welfare and EITC beneﬁts, are only relevant to low-
income families. We now move to describing the broader application
process, of which the FAFSA is just a part.
4.5 The Financial Aid Process
We have just described the process of ﬁlling out a FAFSA, which is sim-
ilar in length to a 1040. There is a key difference between the aid and tax
forms, however. When a taxpayer has completed his or her 1040, he or
she knows how much tax is owed. More than twenty of the questions on
the 1040 are calculations or look-ups in tax tables that allow ﬁlers to ar-
rive at this bottom line of tax liability. Completing the FAFSAyields ab-
solutely no information about aid eligibility. In fact, deﬁnitive informa-
tion about aid eligibility does not arrive until months after the FAFSAis
submitted, in the spring before college enrollment.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the student aid process. Prospective freshmen
typically ﬁle a FAFSA in the spring of their senior year of high school.
Many schools require that the FAFSA be ﬁled by March 1, but students
are not allowed by the Department of Education to ﬁle a FAFSA until
January 1. Once the FAFSAis submitted, the U.S. Department of Educa-
tion computes the EFC. The EFC, but not any estimate of aid eligibility,
is mailed to the applicant as well as the colleges to which she or he has
applied (U.S. Department of Education 2005d).
The federal government does not notify students of their federal aid
eligibility; rather, this is left to the colleges to which students are admit-
ted. Colleges use the EFC to personalize a package of grants and loans
for each student, which they then mail out in award letters, typically in
March and April. Only upon receiving these award letters do students
learn about their federal aid for the upcoming year.
4.6 A Quantitative Analysis of the Beneﬁts of Complexity
Complexity in the aid system arises from efforts to precisely measure
ability to pay for college. The design of the current federal aid system re-
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rationale for the FAFSA is that its detailed questions allow aid adminis-
trators to identify these needy students. The marginal contribution of
each question to this targeting goal can be quantiﬁed, and in this section
we undertake this exercise. Our goal is to measure the beneﬁts of com-
plexity: the degree to which it improves the targeting of aid. These ben-
eﬁts can then be weighed against the costs of complexity, which we ex-
plore in the next section.
To preview the results: we ﬁnd that of the 127 questions on the FAFSA,
only a handful have any substantial effect on the distribution of student
aid. Most of the FAFSA could be eliminated without doing violence to
the revealed distributional priorities of the federal aid programs.
4.6.1 Empirical Methodology
We use individual-level data from the restricted-use, nationally rep-
resentative 2003–2004 National Postsecondary Student Aid Survey
(NPSAS 2004) to examine the relationship between federal aid received
and information in the FAFSA. The 2004 NPSAS includes FAFSA data
for 56,440 undergraduate federal aid applicants. We limited our sample
to 26,156 full-time undergraduates (dependent or independent) who at-
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Figure 4.1
The student aid application processtended the same institution for the full year. From this sample we drop
1,733 individuals who were missing an EFC, as well as 170 individuals
missing other critical data elements such as income or family size. This
results in a ﬁnal sample of 24,253 individuals.
We focus on Pell Grants and subsidized loans, the most expensive
components of federal need-based aid. To replicate each student’s Pell
and loan eligibility, as well as to test the consequences of formula sim-
pliﬁcation, we coded the 2003–2004 EFC, Pell, and Stafford loan formu-
las and rules for dependent and independent students as outlined in the
960-page 2003–2004 Federal Student Aid Handbook (U.S. Department of
Education 2003a).
The federal EFC formula for dependent students adds together par-
ents’adjusted gross income (or W-2 earnings for nontax-ﬁlers) and other
income. It then subtracts a number of allowances, of which the largest is
taxes paid, and adds in 12 percent of parents’ assets over an asset pro-
tection allowance that depends on parents’ages and marital status (for
example, the allowance is 42,200 dollars for a married couple in which
the older parent is 45). Retirement savings and the value of a primary
home are not counted as assets. The resulting ﬁgure is called parents’ ad-
justed available income (AAI). A progressive marginal assessment rate
from 22 to 47 percent is applied to this number, and the result is then di-
vided by the number of children in college to obtain the parents’ ex-
pected contribution.
The dependent student’s expected contribution is computed by sum-
ming the student’s adjusted gross income and other income, subtracting
a few allowances, and applying a 50 percent assessment rate. Thirty-ﬁve
percent of any student assets are added to this ﬁgure to yield the stu-
dent’s expected contribution. Students have no asset protection al-
lowance. The ﬁnal EFC is obtained by adding the student’s expected
contribution to the parents’expected contribution.
The expected contribution for independent students with children is
calculated much like that of the parents of dependent children. The ex-
pected contribution of independent students without children is calcu-
lated much like that of dependent students, but with higher income and
asset allowances. The total contribution is divided by the number of
family members in college to calculate the EFC.
For both dependent and independent students, the Pell Grant is
awarded by subtracting the EFC from the maximum Pell Grant (4,050
dollars). Following federal rules, grants between 0 and 199 dollars are
rounded down to 0 dollars, and grants between 200 and 399 dollars are
Complexity and Targeting in Federal Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis 121rounded up to 400 dollars. Pell Grants of over 2,700 dollars are adjusted
downward for students at very-low-tuition institutions (tuition and fees
of less than 675 dollars in 2003–2004), using what is called the tuition sen-
sitivity adjustment. Pell Grants are also reduced if the calculated amount
exceeds the cost of attendance at the student’s institution (which is pro-
vided in NPSAS, as reported by the schools). Among full-time students
in our sample, the tuition-sensitivity adjustment applied to only thirty-
ﬁve students and the cost of attendance adjustment applied to none.
Subsidized Stafford loan eligibility is estimated by subtracting the esti-
mated EFC, estimated Pell grant, and any other grants from the cost of
attendance. The result is capped at the maximum loan amount for the
student’s class level and dependency status.
We ﬁrst use the NPSAS data to replicate aid under the current for-
mula, and compare these calculated amounts with their actual values as
documented in the NPSAS. Our predicted aid values are extremely close
to their actual values. Regressing the actual against the predicted values
yields an R2 of 1.00 for the EFC and 0.997 for the Pell Grant.8 To measure
the inﬂuence of the various FAFSAcomponents on aid, we sequentially
exclude data items from the aid formula, recalculate aid, and compare
the simulated aid amounts to the baseline values described previously.9
Mechanically, this is achieved by setting the value of the excluded items
to zero.10We measure the predictive power of these simulations with the
R2 from regressions of the baseline aid values against their simulated
values under simpliﬁcation.
While the R2 communicates the proportion of the variation in aid that
can be attributed to each set of variables, it does not tell us who wins and
who loses. We therefore plot gains and losses against families’ﬁnancial
resources. As our measure of ﬁnancial resources, we will primarily use
the aid system’s current summary statistic for a family’s ability to pay for
college, the expected family contribution (EFC). If our simulations re-
produce the current distribution of aid across the EFC, then we have
successfully reproduced the current system’s distributional priorities.
We will also use adjusted gross income, a more familiar metric for ﬁ-
nancial resources, for some of our graphs.
4.6.2 How Is Targeting Affected When We Discard 80 percent of
the FAFSA?
We start by eliminating all of the data used in the aid calculation except
for adjusted gross income of the parents (or independent students and
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sets, parents’ and students’ marital status, family size, and number of
family members in college. This approach (Simulation A) discards par-
ents’ and student’s taxes paid, the types of income tax forms ﬁled, and
the required worksheets (reproduced in the Appendix) that elicit infor-
mation about transfer income (such as the EITC, welfare, and Social
Security) and other income (child support). These worksheets account
for forty-ﬁve of the seventy ﬁnancial questions used in the calculation
of aid. Using only the items in Simulation A would cut the number of
ﬁnancial questions on the FAFSA by more than 80 percent.
With this substantial reduction in complexity, Pell Grant eligibility
changes by less than 100 dollars for 76 percent of aid applicants (see table
4.2). The subsidized loan offer changes by less than 100 dollars for 84 per-
cent of aid applicants. The correlation between the existing Pell and the
simulated Pell is 0.95, and that between the existing and simulated sub-
sidized loan is 0.91. This reduction in complexity has a small impact on
program costs, with the average Pell dropping by 14 dollars (less than 1
percent). All of this decrease in the Pell occurs among families with in-
come over 30,000 dollars; families with lower incomes actually see an in-
crease in their grants (see ﬁgure 4.2). Loans decrease more substantially,
by an average of 215 dollars, or 7 percent, with the decrease concentrated
among families with incomes between 55,000 and 75,000 dollars.
Why are we able to throw out so much information about applicants,
with relatively little consequence for their aid eligibility? First, many of
the data items on the FAFSA are relevant to very few families (e.g., liv-
ing stipends for the military and clergy, foreign income); that is, while
these items affect eligibility, they are nonzero for a small number of
people. Second, some of the items are common, but only at the top or
bottom of the income distribution (e.g., IRArollovers, welfare beneﬁts).
Those at the top or bottom of the income distribution qualify for no aid
or the maximum of aid solely on the basis of their income, rendering ad-
ditional information about their ﬁnancial situation irrelevant. If we
know that a family of four earns 20,000 dollars a year, we also know the
family is eligible for the Pell Grant, and information about the family’s
food stamps, medical expenses, and welfare beneﬁts is redundant. Sim-
ilarly, if a family of three earns 100,000 dollars a year, then information
about the family’s 401(k) investments, ﬁnancial assets, and business in-
come is redundant.
It is clear in ﬁgure 4.2 that this particular approach affects the distri-
bution of loans more than that of grants. Why is this true? Subsidized
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Figure 4.2
Changes in the distribution of Pell Grants and Subsidized Staford Loans under simula-
tion A (which discards 80% of the FAFSA)loan eligibility is based on the same measure of ability to pay (the EFC)
as Pell Grants. Therefore, any simpliﬁcation that exactly preserves the
EFC will preserve both Pell Grant and subsidized loan amounts. How-
ever, slight changes in EFCs that have no implication for Pell Grants can
have implications for student loan eligibility. This is because many fam-
ilies who are nowhere near the threshold for Pell receipt are on the mar-
gin of receiving a larger (or smaller) subsidized loan. Lower- and
middle-income families often have EFCs well below their total cost of at-
tendance and thus qualify for the maximum loans regardless of small
changes in their EFCs. But such small changes can affect upper-income
families, whose EFCs may be just above or below their cost of atten-
dance.
4.6.3 How Is Targeting Affected When We Disregard Assets?
We next discard parents’and student’s assets from the calculation of aid
(Simulation B). The “taxation” of assets by the aid formula has been
roundly criticized by economists. Economists (e.g., Edlin 1993 and Feld-
stein 1995) have argued that the taxation of assets by the aid formula cre-
ates horizontal inequities: identical families with identical lifetime earn-
ings can be treated very differently by the aid system, with aid reduced
for the family that has sacriﬁced consumption in order to save for col-
lege.
In practical terms, assets have little impact on the calculation of federal
aid. When we drop all assets from the aid formula, 75 percent of appli-
cants experience a change of less than 100 dollars in their Pell Grant. Thir-
teen percent see a change of more than 500 dollars in their Pell. Exclud-
ing assets increases the average Pell at low levels of income (ﬁgure 4.3).
Total Pell expenditures in this simulation increase by just 3.3 percent over
their current level, by an average of 54 dollars per applicant. Student loan
offers drop slightly (relative to their current level) using this approach,
by 4.2 percent. The decrease in eligibility is again concentrated among
families with incomes over 60,000 dollars. For 84 percent of applicants,
subsidized loan eligibility changes by less than 100 dollars.
Assets have so little effect on aid eligibility because few households
have assets that are taxed by the aid formula. Families hold the vast ma-
jority of their wealth in homes and retirement funds, both of which are
protected by the aid formula. Other ﬁnancial assets count only if they are
above a threshold that increases with the age of the parents (up to 54,500
dollars). Among dependent students who ﬁle a FAFSA, 85 percent have
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Figure 4.3
Changes in the distribution of Pell Grants and Subsidized Stafford loans under simula-
tion B (which additionally ignores assets)no assets above the disregard. Among those from families with income
below 50,000 dollars, it’s 93 percent.11 As a result, for the overwhelming
majority of families the effective tax rate on assets is already zero.12
It could be the case, however, that families with substantial assets
simply do not ﬁle a FAFSA, since they know they will not be eligible for
aid. In this case, the students ﬁling a FAFSA would be unrepresentative
of the entire population of college students. We can check on this by com-
paring assets of current FAFSA applicants to assets of all households
with similar incomes. We do so using data from the 2004 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, focusing on households that contain children and have
income of below 50,000 dollars (the effective income cap for Pell eligibil-
ity). Among all such households, the 50th percentile of nonretirement ﬁ-
nancial assets is below 1000 dollars and the 95th percentile is below
40,000 dollars.13 The analogous ﬁgures for dependent Pell recipients in
the NPSAS 2004 are quite similar: 200 and 31,000 dollars.14
These ﬁgures indicate that the assets of households currently apply-
ing for aid are quite similar to the population that could apply for aid.
These statistics offer no support for the concern that a substantial popu-
lation of low-income, high-asset families will gain Pell eligibility if as-
sets are completely removed from taxation. This is not to say that there
no such families will gain eligibility: under this simulation, 0.65 percent
of Pell recipients have more than 250,000 dollars in assets. These fami-
lies would receive a combined 42.5 million dollars in Pell Grants. While
the existence of such wrongful recipients can be politically challenging,
they represent only a very small fraction of total program expenditures.
This political cost and increase in expenditures should be weighed again
the implied reduction in complexity for the other 99.35 percent of aid ap-
plicants.
4.6.4 How Is Targeting Affected When We Disregard Dependent
Students’ Earnings?
The aid formula taxes student earnings (over an income protection al-
lowance of 2,550 dollars) at a rate of 50 percent.15 Variation in students’
earnings is driven predominantly by work hours rather than variation
in hourly wages. As a result, this is primarily a tax on students’work ef-
fort. The tax falls more heavily on low-income households, since both
student work hours and earnings drop as parental income rises. While
73 percent of dependent students from lower-income families have pos-
itive earnings, the ﬁgure is 62 percent for students from upper-income
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income group, as compared to 2,231 dollars for the upper-income group.
When we exclude the earnings of dependent students from the calcu-
lation of aid eligibility (Simulation C), the Pell Grants of 72 percent of aid
applicants are essentially unchanged, while the subsidized loans of 84
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Figure 4.4
Changes in the distribution of Pell Grants and Subsidized Stafford Loans under simula-
tion C (which additionally ignores students’earnings)percent of applicants are unchanged. The correlation of this simulated
Pell Grant with the current Pell Grant is 0.92; the analogous correlation
for the subsidized loan is 0.90. In ﬁgure 4.4, we plot the associated
changes in Pell Grant and subsidized loan eligibility against income.
Since discarding dependent students’ earnings mechanically increases
calculated need, three times as many applicants would see a signiﬁcant
increase (500 dollars or more) in Pell eligibility as would see a signiﬁcant
decrease. Pell Grants increase most for those whose parents earn be-
tween 15,000 and 40,000 dollars per year. This is the most expensive ap-
proach so far discussed, with average Pell Grants increasing by 185 dol-
lars per applicant (11.5 percent); grants change only for dependent
students (for independent students, approaches B and C are equiva-
lent). Loans are relatively unaffected by this approach, with the average
offer dropping by about 1 percent, or 39 dollars.
This last approach limits the data required to calculate aid items to in-
come, marital status, family size, and number of family members in col-
lege. For younger, dependent students, these data items reﬂect the in-
come and characteristics of their parents’household. For older students
who have their own households, these data items reﬂect the income and
characteristics of their own household. Most of these data items are al-
ready collected in income tax returns, a point to which we will return
later in the paper.
4.7 A Quantitative Analysis of the Costs of Complexity
The previous section showed that the beneﬁts of complexity are quite
small. What are its costs? We posited earlier in the paper that com-
plexity and uncertainty in traditional student aid may blunt its ability
to inﬂuence schooling decisions. In this section, we ﬂesh out this hy-
pothesis, borrowing insights from economic theory and evidence.
Both classical and behavioral economics offer useful insights into the
effect of complexity in aid on schooling decisions. The classical model
highlights the transaction costs of applying for aid (primarily time
costs), which reduce the net value of aid to potential students. For stu-
dents on the margin of college, these additional transactions costs
may tip the cost-beneﬁt calculation against college enrollment. Be-
havioral economics suggests that complexity in aid could discourage
a student from attending college even if a rational calculation of
schooling costs and beneﬁts would suggest that college was the opti-
mal choice.
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Aid on Schooling Decisions
In the human capital model, individuals weigh the present costs of
schooling against its future beneﬁts. Costs include opportunity costs
(forgone earnings) and direct costs (tuition and fees). For some students,
these costs will be partially offset by ﬁnancial aid. The value of any such
aid, in turn, is reduced by the opportunity cost of the time required to
obtain the aid. From a rational perspective, then, the pertinent question
is whether the costs of applying for aid plausibly outweigh its expected
value. If the costs of aid outweigh its beneﬁts for those on the margin of
college, then this would explain why federal aid has little effect on
schooling decisions.
What are the costs of applying for aid? Costs include the time needed
to read the documents, understand the rules, collect the required docu-
ments, and ﬁll out the form. How long does this process take? The De-
partment of Education estimates that this entire process takes one hour,
which strikes us as implausible. Reading the instructions would take 20
minutes for a typical adult reading at a speed of 300 words per minute.17
This would leave 40 minutes for applicants to actually answer the 127
questions on the FAFSA, requiring the peppy pace of three questions per
minute. In the remainder of this section, we examine the questions asked
on the FAFSA in order to get a sense of the burden they place on appli-
cants, especially low-income applicants.
All questions on the FAFSA are not created equal; some require con-
siderably less time than others. For some, little thought is required: for
example, ﬁfty-ﬁve questions ask essentially for identifying or demo-
graphic information. While the remaining seventy-two questions do ask
about ﬁnances, families with uncomplicated lives can skip through
some of them quickly. For example, never-divorced parents can rapidly
move through questions about child support.
Other questions can be answered quickly if an applicant and her or his
parents have already completed their federal tax returns. About thirty
ﬁnancial items required for an EFC calculation for dependent students
refer to lines on the 1040, and so fall into this category. However, about
half of ﬁrst-year, dependent applicants had not yet ﬁled all their federal
tax forms by the time they had submitted their FAFSA in 2003.18 This is
likely because schools urge applicants to ﬁle the FAFSA early so that
they do not miss a chance to access limited aid funds.19 In fact, the
FAFSA itself prominently lists thirteen states that have aid application
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have not yet ﬁled taxes have to amend their FAFSAs once they ﬁle,
adding to their time costs.
For those who have completed their federal taxes, and so can answer
tax-related questions quickly, there still remain the FAFSAitems that do
not correspond to items on tax returns. Table 4.3 lists some data items
queried by the FAFSA but not the 1040. Several are open ended and re-
quire calculation or record-searching on the part of the applicant:
“As of today, what is the net worth of your (and spouse’s) investments, includ-
ing real estate (not your home)? Net worth means current value minus debt.”
“As of today, what is your (and spouse’s) total current balance of cash, checking,
and savings accounts?”
“Other untaxed income not reported elsewhere on worksheets A and B (e.g.,
worker’s compensation, untaxed portions of railroad retirement beneﬁts, Black
Lung beneﬁts, disability, combat pay not reported on the tax return)? Don’t in-
clude student aid, Workforce Investment Act educational beneﬁts, non tax ﬁlers’
combat pay, or beneﬁts from ﬂexible spending arrangements, for example, cafe-
teria plans.”
It seems unlikely that such questions could be answered in twenty sec-
onds.
Table 4.3 shows that once families have completed their tax forms,
they still face quite a bit more work. This is true for low-income as well
as upper-income families. In fact, six of the questions in table 4.3 apply
primarily to low-income families (e.g., welfare beneﬁts) while seven ap-
ply to families of any income level (e.g., child support, checking account
balances). Only two apply primarily to upper-income families (business
holdings and 401(k) contributions).
What is a reasonable estimate of the average time required to complete
a FAFSA? We showed in table 4.1 that the FAFSAis comparable in length
to a 1040, which the IRS estimates takes sixteen hours to complete. The
shorter 1040A and 1040EZ are estimated to require thirteen and eight
hours, respectively. Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992), based on their own
survey data, conclude that the time required for tax compliance averages
twenty-seven hours per ﬁling household, with time estimates higher for
low- and high-income households. Ten hours per family is therefore a
conservative estimate of the length of time required to complete a
FAFSA: longer than the IRS’s estimate of the time needed for a 1040EZ,
but less than their estimates for the 1040Aor long form, and substantially
less than the twenty-seven hours estimated by Blumenthal and Slemrod.
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What Does the Aid Application Ask that the 1040 Does Not?
Relevant to  Relevant to 
Lower-Income Upper-Income 
Families Families
Welfare beneﬁts, including Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (TANF). Don’t include food stamps or subsidized 
housing. ✓
Taxable earnings from need-based employment programs, 
such as Federal Work-Study and need-based portions of 
fellowships and assistantships. ✓
If you receive veteran’s education beneﬁts, for how many 
months from July 1, 2006, through June 30, 2007, will you 
receive these beneﬁts, and what amount will you receive 
per month? ✓
Housing, food, and other living allowances made to mem-
bers of the military, clergy, and others (including cash 
payments and cash value of beneﬁts). ✓
Social Security beneﬁts received, for all household members, 
as reported in question 84 (or 65 for your parents), that 
were not taxed (such as SSI). ✓
Veteran’s noneducation beneﬁts such as Disability, Death 
Pension, or Dependency & Indemnity Compensation 
(DIC), and/or VA Educational Work-Study allowances. ✓
Payments to tax-deferred pension and savings plans (paid 
directly or withheld from earnings) including, but not 
limited to, amounts reported on the W-2 Form. ✓
As of today, what is the net worth of your (and spouse’s) 
current businesses and/or investment farms? ✓
Student grant and scholarship aid reported to the IRS in 
adjusted gross income ✓✓
Child support you paid because of divorce or separation or 
as a result of a legal requirement. ✓✓
Child support you received for all children. ✓✓
Other untaxed income not reported elsewhere (e.g., worker’s 
compensation, untaxed portions of railroad retirement 
beneﬁts. Black Lung beneﬁts, disability, combat pay). ✓✓
Money received or paid on your behalf (e.g., bills), not re-
ported elsewhere on this form. ✓✓
As of today, what is the net worth of your (and spouse’s) 
investments, including real estate (not your home)? Net 
worth means current value minus debt. ✓✓
As of today, what is your (and spouse’s) total current balance 
of cash, checking, and savings accounts? ✓✓Note that our ten-hour estimate is for the typical family. For some
families, the process will be much shorter. Families that are intact,
whose members have stable jobs and uncomplicated ﬁnances, and who
have already ﬁled their federal taxes may well take less than ten hours
to complete the form. Low-income families, the target of federal aid,
tend not to ﬁt this description. Research by Holtzblatt and McCubbin
(2004) on low-income tax ﬁlers ﬁnds that such ﬁlers are more likely to
have complicated living arrangements (single parents living in another
family’s home) and more erratic employment patterns (multiple jobs,
unemployment spells). For these families, paperwork from multiple
sources may be required to complete even basic questions about em-
ployment income.
It is also likely that the length of time required to learn about and com-
ply with any given provision of the aid process is higher for low-income
families. Half of low-income high school seniors have no parent who at-
tended college (ED 2002) and so have no experience with the aid sys-
tem.20 Thirteen percent live in families in which English is not the pri-
mary language, double the rate of high-income youth. More than
two-thirds of children from families with incomes below 25,000 dollars
have no Internet access at home, compared with 12 percent of families
with incomes above 50,000 dollars (Day, Janus, and Davis 2005).21
These time costs of applying for aid reduce the value of ﬁnancial aid
for applicants. At average hourly wages of 17.50 dollars (Bureau of La-
bor Statistics), ten hours “costs” a family 175 dollars. For teenagers and
low-income parents, the cost is lower than this average: median earn-
ings for a high school graduate are roughly 20,000 dollars. Even if an aid
application takes twenty hours for these families, this reduces the value
of aid by only about 200 dollars.
Even a FAFSA that required many nights to complete would still be
worthwhile, from a rational perspective. Across all undergraduate aid
applicants, the average Pell Grant in 2003–2004 was approximately 1,100
dollars, handily outweighing the time costs just described.22 Further, the
returns to a college education dwarf any reasonable estimate of the costs
of applying for aid. Barrow and Rouse (2005) estimate that getting a col-
lege degree is equivalent to a 300,000 dollars windfall—and this is a net
beneﬁt, after subtracting out tuition costs and wages foregone while en-
rolled. Any rational individual deterred from going to college by trans-
action costs of the magnitude described so far could only have a very low
expected return to college. If this is the case, then the welfare losses pro-
duced by this person failing to go to college are quite small.
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Student Aid on Schooling Decisions
A rational calculation of transaction costs did not get us far in explain-
ing the null impact of federal aid on schooling decisions. But a growing
body of economic research has shown that individual decisions depart
systematically from rationality, particularly in settings in which present
sacriﬁce is required in order to access future gains. Savings behavior has
received particular attention from behavioral economists. From a ra-
tional perspective, people should save for retirement. Nonsavers agree
with this rational perspective: repeated surveys show nonsavers stating
that saving is important and that they want to save. Similarly, survey
data show that an overwhelming majority of low-income high school
students believe that college is important, and that they intend to go.
The analogy between saving and schooling is apt: both are capital-
building endeavors that require current sacriﬁce in pursuit of future
gain.
Kahneman and Tversky (2000) argue that people are typically loss
averse: they avoid worthwhile bets because losses weigh more heavily
than gains. That is, a dollar lost decreases utility more than a dollar
gained increases it. When gains that are probable but losses are certain,
this will lead to risk aversion and avoidance of even good bets. Certain
costs and probable gains characterize savings and college. Savers must
give up consumption now in hopes of positive market returns and a
long enough life to enjoy the proceeds during retirement. Students must
apply for aid, give up earnings, pay tuition, and study now in hopes of
an uncertain payoff in the labor market. Like retirement savings, college
is a good bet, but there is enormous variance in returns. For some, col-
lege will not pay off, and this possibility may weigh heavily in school-
ing decisions due to loss aversion.
Behavioral economists have also concluded that people’s choices are
strongly inﬂuenced by the default provided them (Samuelson and Zeck-
hauser 1988). This tendency can cause small bureaucratic details to have
a disproportionate impact upon behavior. The best evidence on this
comes from the studies of the defaults presented to employees in mak-
ing choices about their retirement savings. At one large ﬁnancial ser-
vices ﬁrm, the default choice was nonparticipation in the employer
401(k). New employees could check a box on a form to initiate automatic
payroll withdrawal; not checking the box (that is, the default) led to non-
participation. The company then altered the default, with nonparticipa-
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increased 401(k) participation by 50 percentage points (Madrian and
Shea 2001). No rational calculation of transaction costs would predict
this sort of effect.
While there is scant empirical research speciﬁcally relating behavioral
phenomena to college decision-making, it is pretty safe to conclude that
teenagers are not more rational than adults. The time-inconsistent pref-
erences that appear to undermine saving among adults also ﬁt the be-
havior of low-income teenagers. In a project that tracked low-income
youth as they made their schooling decisions, researchers found that
few made a deliberate choice to not go to college (Avery and Kane 2004).
Rather, they missed a key deadline, or incorrectly ﬁlled out a form, or
failed to take a required class, and thereby fell off the path to college: that
is, seemingly minor obstacles put some youth off the path to college.
Defaults appear to particularly affect the behavior of these teenagers.
For upper-income teenagers, the afﬁrmative actions of their parents and
schools establish college entry as the default path. Their high schools
guide them through the multiple steps and deadlines of the college and
ﬁnancial aid process. Informal guidance and support is also provided by
their college-educated relatives and neighbors, who act as de facto
guidance counselors. By contrast, due to their comparatively weak in-
stitutional and social supports, the default option for low-income stu-
dents is to not go to college. Lower-income schools receive fewer visits
from college representatives and have fewer guidance counselors per
student. Parents and siblings are not as likely to have gone to college,
and so cannot compensate for this lack of institutional support.
4.8 Weighing the Costs and Beneﬁts of Complexity in Student Aid
On net, the evidence just discussed is intriguing but speculative. We
have calculated that the time cost of completing aid forms is roughly
2 billion dollars a year, or about 200 dollars per application. From a ra-
tional perspective, these costs are unlikely to prevent a student from ap-
plying for a grant whose average value is over 1,000 dollars. But behav-
ioral economics predicts that complexity will discourage students from
utilizing aid: quasi-experimental evidence shows that complexity af-
fects behavior in a different but related arena (retirement savings); and
observational studies show that high many school students who intend
to go to college get tripped up by seemingly minor obstacles. This body
of evidence comprises a strong but not dispositive case that complexity
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ﬁts of this complexity are conclusively quite small: complexity con-
tributes little to the targeting of aid.
The balance tips further against complexity when we consider the ad-
ministrative costs it imposes on colleges and governments. We have so
far calculated only the costs of complexity that are borne by applicants,
since these are costs that plausibly could explain the null effect of federal
aid on schooling decisions. While administrative costs do not affect the
schooling decisions of individuals, they do belong in any social welfare
calculation of the costs and beneﬁts of complexity in aid. We therefore
now examine these administrative costs.
Financial costs to the government of administering the aid-eligibility
process are small relative to the volume of aid delivered annually: about
220 million dollars. While this ﬁgure is low, it is because the administra-
tive costs have been shifted to colleges, who are responsible for answer-
ing students’ questions, packaging and disbursing federal student aid,
and verifying aid applications. Veriﬁcation is a cumbersome process in
which ﬁnancial aid administrators audit aid applications. Schools are
statutorily required to audit 30 percent of aid applications, and some
audit all applications. At least 3 million such audits take place each
year.24 By comparison, the IRS audit rate is 1.5 percent, implying that
2 million IRS audits take place annually.25
Staff paid by the colleges are responsible for all of these tasks, which
they must undertake in accordance with the 225-page Federal Student
Aid Handbook. A survey of 650 institutions by the National Association
of Financial Aid Administrators (NASFAA) found that ﬁnancial aid of-
ﬁces on average employed nine full-time staff members (Williams 2006).
Using salary estimates from the same organization (Williams 2004), the
6,444 institutions eligible for federal aid would spend a total of 2.1 bil-
lion dollars on salaries for full-time ﬁnancial aid professionals.26 Over-
head and beneﬁts would add further to these costs. To help pay colleges’
administrative costs, the Department of Education allocated to schools
administrative allowances of 83.4 million dollars in 2005. However, the
annual cost of required audits alone is estimated at 432 million dollars
(Advisory Committee on Student Financial Assistance 2005).
The true administrative cost of complexity may be somewhat higher
or lower than our combined estimate of 2.3 billion dollars (for schools
and the federal government). On the one hand, reducing complexity is
not likely to completely eliminate the need for ﬁnancial aid profession-
als. Even with a much simpler application, some staff will still be needed
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does not include the cost of ﬁnancial aid-related computer software or
printing and distributing ﬁnancial aid-related materials.
These administrative costs, along with cost of time applicants spend
completing the FAFSA, constitute a lower bound on the cost of com-
plexity in student aid: perhaps 4 billion dollars a year. The upper bound
is blurrier: at worst, complexity in aid discourages the very population
it targets for assistance from attending college.
4.9 Discussion
The key variables that predict aid—income and family composition—
are currently collected in federal income tax returns. In principle, then,
the aid application could be eliminated altogether and eligibility for stu-
dent aid determined using data already collected by the IRS. Families
could apply for a grant by checking off a box on their income tax form,
instructing IRS to forward applicants’ adjusted gross income, depen-
dency status, and number of dependents to the Department of Educa-
tion. This would eliminate the time costs of applying for aid, saving 2
billion dollars in hours currently lost to ﬁlling out aid forms. Further, if
income information came directly to the Department of Education from
the IRS, rather than from self-reports on a FAFSA, schools would no
longer need to audit three million applications a year. Every application
would effectively be “audited,” since the data generating eligibility
would come directly from the IRS.
This approach would be similar in spirit to a no-return tax system, in
which tax authorities use data they have already collected to determine
tax liability. As of 1996, 36 countries have instituted such approaches
(U.S. Government Accounting Ofﬁce 1996). Gale and Holtzblatt (1997)
discuss several such programs. Most relevant to the current context are
the tax agency reconciliation systems of Denmark and Sweden, in
which, at the taxpayer’s request, the taxing authority generates a return
based on income data already collected by the government. The tax-
payer approves or disputes the return, and then refunds or payments
are made. An analogous approach would have aid applicants indicate
to the Department of Education their desire to make an aid application.
The Department of Education could then generate an application based
on income data held by the IRS, most practically from the previous tax
year.
As in the current system, eligibility for the 2006–2007 academic year
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potential logistical hurdle is that the IRS is not able to conﬁrm income
data immediately upon receiving an income tax return. In this case, eli-
gibility could be based on income from a previous tax year. Because the
IRS can provide transcripts of up to three years of prior taxes (and does
so for thousands of “no paperwork” mortgage applications each year),
eligibility could even be based on an average of several prior years of in-
come. This approach would have other useful properties. It would re-
duce the incentive to shift income between years in order to avoid taxa-
tion of a single year’s income by the aid formula. Several years of income
are also a better measure of permanent income than a single year (Edlin
1993).
A potentially more powerful advantage is that a simpliﬁed aid for-
mula would enable families to easily determine their eligibility well be-
fore their child applies to college. If aid eligibility were determined by
just a couple of data items, such as income and family size, aid could be
described in a lookup table simple enough to put on a poster that could
hang in a high school hallway. The federal government could also proac-
tively mail ﬁnancial aid estimates to taxpayers, much as the Social Secu-
rity Administration now mails out annual beneﬁt estimates. Such early
information may help people to make better-informed decisions about
their long-term investments. High school students of all income levels
overestimate the cost of college. But while high-income students express
conﬁdence that they will ﬁnd a way to pay, low-income students are pes-
simistic about their ability to pay for college (Avery and Kane 2004). The
spring of senior year, when information about aid eligibility currently
arrives, is when many students decide which college to attend. It is un-
likely that many students make their decision about whether to attend
college this late in the game. Information about aid could affect these de-
cisions if they understood their aid options earlier.
We should note that there have been several efforts to simplify the
FAFSA. In 1986, Congress mandated an “automatic zero” EFC for fami-
lies with taxable income below 15,000 dollars who are also eligible to ﬁle
an IRS Form 1040A or 1040EZ. These applicants are legally allowed to
skip more than 50 of the over 70 ﬁnancial questions on the FAFSA. Con-
gress also mandated a simpliﬁed needs test for families earning less than
50,000 dollars who are eligible to ﬁle the 1040Aor 1040EZ: for these fam-
ilies, asset information can be disregarded. These efforts do not appear
to have simpliﬁed the aid application process. Among those who had
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igible to skip the asset questions, 48 percent provided asset information.
Among those who had their application processed under the automatic-
zero EFC formula, 90 percent responded to questions that they were not
required to answer. For example, 63 percent completed at least part of
Worksheet A and 30 percent reported nonzero assets.27
Why do aid applicants answer questions they don’t have to answer?
First, the option to skip questions is poorly communicated. Approved
shortcuts are never mentioned on the paper FAFSA, ﬁlled out by about
half of dependent undergraduate applicants with incomes below 50,000
dollars.28 The option to skip questions is mentioned only midway
through the online version of the FAFSA. Since families are instructed to
prepare for the online application by ﬁlling out printed worksheets that
never mention the option to skip questions, they are likely to have al-
ready gathered the requisite data (or given up on the application) by the
time they reach the option to skip a question. Second, when offered the
option to skip a question on the online FAFSA, they are warned that do-
ing so may threaten their eligibility for state- or school-administered aid
(U.S. Department of Education 2005c).
These failed attempts point to the limits of technology as a tool for
simplifying the aid application (and highlight the potential value of
eliminating the application altogether). Goolsbee (2004) discusses the
limits of technology as a solution to complexity in the tax code. He
points out that those who readily adopt new technologies (such as tax
preparation software or, in the present case, the online FAFSA) are not
likely those who are most burdened by the current system. After ex-
amining the characteristics of those who do and do not use tax prepa-
ration software. Goolsbee concludes that the use of the software is de-
termined not by the complexity faced by the ﬁler but by the costs of
adopting the new technology. Those who use tax software do not have
particularly complicated tax situations, but instead are more likely to
be well-educated and use computers in other parts of their lives. That
is, those who are at ease with technology are the ones who tend to
adopt it.
An examination of the demographics of those who ﬁle the FAFSA
online suggests that the same holds in the present setting (see table
4.4). About 57 percent of ﬁrst-time freshman ﬁled online in 2003. The
median income of these online ﬁlers is 45,636 dollars, while that of pa-
per ﬁlers is 27,332 dollars. The median Pell Grant of web ﬁlers is zero,
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FAFSA are disproportionately nonwhite, with parents who did not go
to college and who do not speak English as a ﬁrst language. These sta-
tistics show that the paper FAFSA is the most relevant application for
the populations whose low college attendance rates are cited in sup-
port of increased spending on federal aid for college. The statistics in
table 4.4 indicate that low-income, nonwhite, ﬁrst-generation college
entrants disproportionately enter the aid system via the paper FAFSA.
Technological solutions to complexity that rely on the online FAFSA
will leave the application experience of nearly half of these students
unaffected.
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Table 4.4 
Applicant Characteristics by Type of FAFSA Filed by First-Year Students
Characteristic Paper Online








Any Pell 58.1 42.1
Neither parent attended college 46.0 30.4
Primary language other than English 12.7 9.0
One or both parents born outside 
United States 23.4 18.1
Race
White, non-Hispanic 55.0 68.3
Black, non-Hispanic 19.5 12.6
Hispanic 16.6 10.3
All other 9.0 8.8
Sample size (unweighted) 6,555 6,629
Source: Authors’calculations using FAFSAdata from NPSAS: 2003–2004. Sample is limited
to 13,226 students (dependent or independent) ﬁrst-year undergraduates who attended a
single institution full time for the full school year and who were not missing key data ele-
ments such as income or actual EFC. Paper FAFSAs include those electronically submitted
by ﬁnancial aid administrators after collecting a paper FAFSA from the student. Income
refers to parents’income for dependent students, or student (and spouse’s) income for in-
dependent students.4.10 Conclusion
Complexity in the federal tax code has received considerable attention
from economists and been the focus of reform efforts for decades. In
contrast, complexity in ﬁnancial aid has received little attention. As col-
lege attendance rates rise, the burden the aid process imposes on fami-
lies is of increasing policy relevance. Even moderate compliance costs
create substantial costs to the economy when summed over the ten mil-
lion households that apply for aid each year. Further, complexity in the
aid process may undermine the efﬁcacy of aid in achieving its purpose,
which is to make college an option for those who could not otherwise af-
ford to attend. If complexity burdens those on the margin of college en-
try, it could well blunt the impact of aid on their schooling decisions.
We have used the perspectives of both classical and behavioral eco-
nomics to examine the costs of complexity in student ﬁnancial aid. Rel-
ative to our previous work (Dynarski and Scott-Clayton 2006, 2007), we
have explored several new areas. We have shown that complexity does
little to improve targeting of either Pell Grants or Stafford-subsidized
loans. Since loans now comprise the bulk of federal aid, this ﬁnding is
particularly important. Further, our analysis of grant and loan eligibility
considers dependent as well as independent students, each of which ac-
count for about half of the undergraduate population. Extending the
analysis to include independent students does not affect our conclusion
that complexity in the aid process does little to improve targeting.
We have also provided a detailed discussion of the time costs of com-
pleting the FAFSA, focusing in particular on the marginal effort re-
quired to complete the FAFSA once a household has ﬁled its federal tax
return. We conclude that while the time cost of the FAFSA likely varies
considerably across households, the Department of Education’s esti-
mate of one hour is a gross understatement. Given the length and com-
plexity of the FAFSA, which approaches that of an IRS 1040, we con-
clude that ten hours is a more reasonable estimate. Ten hours is less than
the sixteen hours the IRS estimates is required for a 1040, which we show
is similar in length to a FAFSA.
We estimate that the ﬁnancial cost of complexity is at least four billion
dollars a year, including time costs of completing the FAFSA(1.75 billion
dollars) and salaries for college staff who administer aid based on the
federal formula (2 billion dollars). Colleges carry out much of the work
involved in determining aid eligibility, including three million audits of
FAFSAs each year. These audits are in response to a federal mandate
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ing the IRS audit rate of 1.5 percent.
The costs of complexity are difﬁcult to measure precisely, but we have
shown that the beneﬁts are clearly miniscule. Much of the complexity in
the aid system does little to improve the targeting of aid. The items that
we ﬁnd drive eligibility for loans and grants—adjusted gross income
and family size—are already collected via income tax forms. Aid eligi-
bility could therefore be determined using existing tax information, and
the aid application could be eliminated. This approach is similar in spirit
to a no-return tax system, in which tax authorities use data they already
have collected to determine tax liability (U.S. Government Accounting
Ofﬁce 1996; Gale and Holtzblatt 1997).
A key lesson of our research is that we can substantially reduce com-
plexity and uncertainty in the aid system if we are willing to tolerate mi-
nor imperfections in measuring ability to pay. At a minimum, a simpler
aid program would increase the efﬁciency of aid dollars by reducing the
administrative and paperwork costs for schools and families. At best,
simpliﬁcation would clarify incentives for students and induce into col-
lege some who now believe it is unaffordable.
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Notes
1. Kaplow (1990, 1996) lays out a framework for considering the costs to individuals,
ﬁrms, and government of complexity in the tax code. Blumenthal and Slemrod (1992) cal-
culate the time cost of compliance for individual taxpayers. Berube, Kim, Forman, and
Burns (2002) focus on compliance costs for the Earned Income Tax Credit. Goolsbee (2004)
has explored whether tax software reduces the costs of complexity for individual taxpay-
ers. Holtzblatt and McCubbin (2004) focus on the impact of complexity on low-income tax-
payers.
2. Beginning in the 2007–2008 academic year, loan limits will increase to 3,500 dollars for
the ﬁrst year and 4,500 dollars for the second year.
144 Dynarski and Scott-Clayton3. Statistics in this paragraph are drawn from Table 54 in Social Security Administration
(1982). Table A in College Board (1998), and Table 174 in U.S. Department of Education
(1998).
4. Most state aid and school scholarships also require the FAFSA. Some colleges require
an additional aid application, such as the College Board’s PROFILE or a school-speciﬁc
form.
5. Until 1973, the federal aid application asked about make and model of the family car
(Wilkinson, 2005).
6. Unless otherwise noted, FAFSAquestion counts are for dependent students, who must
answer questions about their parents’ﬁnances as well as their own.
7. The marginal tax rate on parental income ranges from 22 to 47 percent, while for stu-
dent earnings the tax rate is zero below an earnings protection allowance and 50 percent
above that allowance. The highest tax rate on parental assets is about 6 percent for each
year of college, while the student’s assets can be taxed at 35 percent (this rate will fall to 20
percent as of the 2007–2008 academic year). See Dynarski (2004b) for a discussion of how
the aid tax on assets varies by ownership and asset type.
8. In a small proportion of cases we exactly replicate the EFC but not the Pell Grant. This
may reﬂect overrides of the formula at the discretion of ﬁnancial aid administrators or data
perturbations introduced by the Department of Education to protect data conﬁdentiality.
9. We are not the ﬁrst to estimate the predictive power of individual FAFSAitems on stu-
dent aid. Kane (1995) notes that most of the variation in Pell Grants can be explained
using just a few variables. Stoll and Stedman (2004) use student-level FAFSA data (from
the 1999–2000 NPSAS) to simulate the effect on the EFC of excluding items from the aid
calculation.
10. We have also tested setting excluded values to their means or medians, with substan-
tively similar results. For state of residence and elder parent’s age, which are excluded
from some simulations, a value of zero is not meaningful, so we assign to all applicants the
default values that the aid formula imputes when these items are missing from a FAFSA.
11. Authors’calculations from NPSAS 2004.
12. For 99 percent of aid applicants, the marginal tax rate on assets is zero. We obtain this
ﬁgure by adding 100 dollars to every applicant’s ﬁnancial assets and recalculating aid. For
99 percent of the sample, Pell eligibility is unchanged.
13. Authors’calculations from the 2004 Survey of Consumer Finances. Figure is for house-
holds with children and incomes below 50,000 dollars. The 99th percentile of ﬁnancial,
nonretirement assets for this population is roughly 160,000 dollars.
14. The 99th percentiles of non retirement ﬁnancial assets for dependent and independent
Pell recipients are 95,000 and 13,000 dollars, respectively.
15. In 2007–2008, the disregard will rise to 3,000 dollars and the tax rate will fall to 35 per-
cent. Students also receive allowances for federal taxes paid and an estimate of state taxes
paid. If parents’total allowances exceed parents’income, the excess parents’allowance is
used to protect more of the student’s income.
16. We divide families at the rough median of household income, 50,000 dollars.
17. See Nuttall (1996) on average reading speeds. The FAFSA questionnaire and instruc-
tions contain about 6,000 words.
Complexity and Targeting in Federal Student Aid: A Quantitative Analysis 14518. Authors’ calculations from NPSAS 2004. This includes those who have not yet ﬁled
both the parents’and student’s tax form and those that do not plan to ﬁle income taxes.
19. Nine percent of FAFSAapplicants ﬁle in January, before households have even received
their W-2 forms and other end-of-year tax documents. This time pattern of FAFSA ﬁling is
driven by the deadlines of individual schools and states, some of which request that the
FAFSA be submitted by the ﬁrst of January or February. For example, Michigan State Uni-
versity: “As soon as possible after the January 1 preceding your fall semester, ﬁle the FAFSA.
If you or your parents haven’t ﬁled taxes yet, use estimated data on the FAFSA and correct
it later if necessary” http:/ /ﬁnaid.msu.edu/fa101.asp. Students are commonly warned that
delaying submission of the FAFSAmay threaten their access to limited student aid funds.
20. Authors’ calculations, comparing families with income below 25,000 dollars to those
with income above 50,000 dollars.
21. Authors’calculations using published tables from the computer and Internet supple-
ment to the Current Population Survey (Day, Janus, and Davis 2005).
22. Authors’ calculations using NPSAS 2004. Only undergraduates are eligible for Pell
Grants.
23. An ongoing experiment on the deterrent effects of complexity on the FAFSAwill pro-
vide solid evidence in this area. Eric Bettinger, Bridget Terry Long, and Phil Oreopolous
have partnered with H&R Block to preﬁll the FAFSA and provide projected ﬁnancial aid
estimates to randomly selected individuals who utilized H&R Block’s tax preparation ser-
vices. College enrollment data for the treatment and control groups will then be collected
from administrative records.
24. A survey by the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators found
that schools audit 40 percent of aid applications: one in ten schools audit all applications.
Williams (2006).
25. Although the Department of Education states that FAAs do not need to be “tax ex-
perts,” they “must have a fundamental understanding of relevant tax issues that can con-
siderably affect the need analysis” (ED. 2005b, p. 101). For example, if a student’s parents
divorced after ﬁling their taxes, the FAA may need to recalculate the relevant parent’s
taxes as if he or she had ﬁled as a single individual.
26. Estimates assume each ofﬁce employs one director at 62,000 dollars, one assistant di-
rector at 44,000 dollars, 2.5 ofﬁcers at 35,000 dollars each, 1.3 clerical staff at 29,000 dollars
each, and three other staff members at 30,000 dollars each. Salary estimates are from
Williams (2004) and are inﬂated to 2006 dollars.
27. Authors’calculations from NPSAS 2004.
28. Authors’calculations from NPSAS 2004.
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